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DIVORCE: "LIVING APART' UNDER THE SAME ROOF? -
HAWKINS v. HAWKINS
In Hawkins v. Hawkins' the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia decided that a husband and wife, who had no marital re-
lations or social life together for twenty years were entitled to a
divorce under the statute making "voluntary separation from bed and
board for five consecutive years without cohabitatio"2 a ground for
absolute divorce, even though the parties had lived in the same house
for the entire period. Although they did eat together, they neither
spoke to each other nor occupied the same bedroom. The court pointed
out that living under the same roof was not the essential element of
cohabitation and that eating together at the same table sometimes
does not connote "sharing a board". They construed the statute "to
permit termination in law of certain marriages which have ceased to
exist in fact". 3
The view expressed in this decision does not correspond with the
law in Kentucky, which has a similar statute providing that a divorce
may be granted to either party where the spouses have lived apart
without any cohabitation for five consecutive years next before applica-
1191 F. 2d 344 (App. D.C. 1951).
2D. C. CoDE sec. 16-403 (1940).
' Supra, note 1 at 345. The Hawkins case is in accord generally with previous
D.C. law. In Boyce v. Boyce, 153 F. 2d 229 (C.A.D.C. 1946), practically the
same situation existed as was presented in the Hawkins case. Here the court de-
cided that the District of Columbia statute, D.C. CODE sec. 16-403 (1940), entitled
the wife to a divorce when the couple after separation continued to occupy sep-
arate rooms under the same roof but had no marital relations and ate at the same
table though at different times. The court stated "Nor is the fact that the same
roof sheltered both parties a condonation. The essential thing is not separate roofs,
but separate lives .... These parties have been separated as effectively as though
they were living in different homes." 153 F. 2d 229, 230 (C.A.D.C. 1946). The
court has expressed the opinion in Hurd v. Hurd, 179 F. 2d 68 (1949), that the
fact that the parties continuing to reside together in the same dwelling is merely
evidentiary on the question whether they are living together as husband and wife.
However, continued occupancy of the same dwelling may be evidence of har-
monious relations or of compelling necessity on the part of one or both of the
parties. As evidenced by earlier decisions, the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia in interpreting the statute in question states clearly that there is no
dispute as to the parties living separate and apart, without cohabitation, in all such
similar cases, but the main question is whether the separation was voluntary.
Buford v. Buford, U.S. 156 F. 2d 567 (C.A.D.C. 1946); Martin v. Martin, 160 F. 2d
20 (C.A.D.C. 1947); Helfgott v. Helfgott, 179 F. 2d 39 (C.A.D.C. 1949). In
another case, Butler v. Butler, 154 F. 2d 203 (C.A.D.C. 1946), the court went
so far as to say that it was not necessary even to discuss the definition of the word
"cohabitation" as it appears in the District of Columbia statute. Therefore the
Court in the Hawkins case seems justified under its precedents in not considering
the requirements of separation from bed and board to mean separation from bed
and board under the same roof.
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tion.4 In Ratliff v. Ratliff5 the husband sued his wife for divorce on the
ground that they lived separate and apart without cohabitation for
five consecutive years. Testimony tended to indicate that for some
eight or ten years prior to this action the couple were not on good
terms in that they did not eat together and seldom spoke to each
other. The husband testified that they did not room together and did
not cohabit for more than five years before instituting this suit. The
chancellor gave the husband an absolute divorce. The Court of Ap-
peals in reversing the alimony award by the chancellor stated that
the Court had "several times written that where a couple live together
in the same house and hold themselves out as husband and wife, the
fact that they did not indulge in sexual relations for five years would
not entitle them to a divorce under KRS 403.020."6 It seems that the
main basis for not allowing the divorce in the Kentucky cases is the
fact that the parties still live together in the same house, and the facts
that they have no sexual intercourse during the statutory period and
that they do not eat together or sleep in the same room are not
determinative. 7 However, the District of Columbia Court comes to the
opposite conclusion in the Hawkins case, holding that living in the
same house is not the essential factor, and even implies that oc-
casionally eating together would have no effect upon the granting of
the divorce.
8
The majority of jurisdictions-with similar legislation have held that
such statutes absolutely require that the parties live apart under
separate roofs. Living in the same dwelling precludes divorce how-
ever strained the relationship.9 In Quinn v. Brown,10 "living apart"
was interpreted by the Louisiana court to mean living apart so that
the neighborhood may see that the parties are not living together. The
Rhode Island court was faced with an even more difficult problem.
There the husband and wife lived in separate apartments in the same
building. Seemingly the Rhode Island court came to the conclusion
'Ky. REv. STAT. 403.020, sec. (1), subsec. (b) (1948).
312 Ky. 450, 227 S.W. 2d 989 (1950).
6 Id. at 453, S.W. at 991. See Colvin v. Colvin, 300 Ky. 781, 190 S.W. 2d 473
(1945); McDaniel v. McDaniel, 292 Ky. 56, 165 S.W. 2d 966 (1942); Gates v.
Gates, 192 Ky. 253, 232 S.W. 378 (1921).
7 McDaniel v. McDaniel, 292 Ky. 56, 165 S.W. 2d 966 (1942). See 17 Am.
Jut. 232 (1938).
8 The law is very clear in Kentucky that a divorce will be granted for living
apart without any cohabitation for five consecutive years no matter which party is
at fault. Ward v. Ward, 213 Ky. 606, 281 S.W. 801 (1926); Parker v. Parker, 31
Ky. Law Rep. 1228, 104 S.W. 1028 (1907); Clark v. Clark, 21 Ky. Law Rep. 955,
53 S.W. 644 (1899); Logan v. Logan, 7 Ky. Opin. 89 (1873).
'See the extensive annotations in 51 A.L.R. 768 (1927); 111 A.L.R. 871
(1937); 166 A.L.R. 508 (1947)."0159 La. 570, 105 So. 624 (1925).
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that the main distinction was between failure of the parties to main-
tain marital relations and failure to live separate and apart from each
other thereby evidencing that the separate roof argument is not in-
fallible. The court cast aside as of little importance the fact that the
husband owned the building in which both parties lived and gave a
divorce to the wife. 1
The language of the Kentucky and District of Columbia statutes
can be reconciled so that contrary judicial decisions seem unwar-
ranted. The "living apart without any cohabitation" in the Kentucky
statute is construed to mean that the parties are precluded from co-
habiting together and also from living under the same roof. The
"voluntary separation from bed and board" clause in the District of
Columbia statute can reasonably be interpreted to mean that, for the
parties to be separated from bed and board, they must not share a
board by living together under the same roof.
It is submitted that Kentucky, even if its statute contained exactly
the same wording as the District of Columbia statute, would still
maintain that it should not be interpreted to allow the parties to live
in the same dwelling and then insist that they had not cohabited to-
gether. Such a result would expand the statute further than could
posibly have been intended, without boldly stating that the parties
may remain together under the same roof and still satisfy the require-
ments for absolute divorce simply by discontinuing the usual marital
relations and associations. Although the law in Kentucky in the past
was somewhat doubtful where the parties continued to live in the
same house, but sexual intercourse was refused,12 it is now clear that
the requirement of living apart without cohabitation is to be literally
construed as meaning living under separate roofs without any co-
habitation.'
3
If it is necessary that one or the other of the parties be granted a
divorce, although they have lived together in the same dwelling but
without normal relations, then there are other grounds that can be
brought under the existing circumstances, such as mental cruelty, in
some states for the denial of reasonable marital intercourse and con-
structive desertion.' 4 Any of these grounds will be sufficient for divorce
Stewart v. Stewart, 45 R.I. 375, 122 A. 778 (1923).
See Evans v. Evans, 247 Ky. 1, 56 S.W. 2d 547 (1933); Gates v. Gates, 192
Ky. 253, 282 S.W. 378 (1921); Witt v. Witt, 188 Ky. 45, 220 S.W. 1065, (1920);
Burton v. Burton, 184 Ky. 268, 211 S.W. 869 (1919).
McDaniel v. McDaniel, 292 Ky. 56, 165 S.W. 2d 966 (1942).
' As to mental cruelty, see Wermeling v. Wermeling, 217 Ky. 126, 288 S.W.
1050 (1926); Purcell v. Purcell, 197 Ky. 627, 247 S.W. 760 (1923); Riggins v.
Riggins, 191 Ky. 22, 228 S.W. 1030 (1921); Hooe v. Hooe, 122 Ky. 590, 92 S.W.
317 (1906). As to denial of reasonable marital intercourse, see Bitter v. Ritter,
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if provided for by statute and if the spouse seeking the decree is in-
nocent of any wrongdoing, although they may have resided together
under the same roof throughout the period. The ground of mental
cruelty is predicated upon a repetition of less serious acts by the guilty
spouse combined with a course of marital unkindness other than phy-
sical violence, the cumulative effect of which is to make impossible
the continuance of cohabitation by the spouses. 15 Denial of reasonable
marital intercourse can be charged and a divorce granted though the
parties at all times remained living under the same roof and in a
sense cohabited together. Although by the weight of authority deser-
tion usually means a cessation of cohabitation with an intent to
abandon, if one spouse by his or her misconduct gives the other justifi-
able cause for leaving then this conduct amounts to a constructive
desertion though the one charged therewith does not actually leave. 16
It is urged that the better view holds with the Kentucky court and
the majority of jurisdictions in not allowing an absolute divorce under
this type of statute where the parties live together in the same dwelling.
JAMEs F. HOGE
EVIDENCE: ADMISSIBILITY OF UNCOMMUNICATED
THREATS OF A DECEASED PERSON -GRIFFIN v.
UNITED STATES
It is entirely probable that in more than half the cases of prosecu-
tion for murder which have arisen in our courts, a plea of self-defense
has been presented by the accused. Suppose there is some evidence
of acts on the part of the deceased in this situation which might have
justified the attack by the defendant? Should evidence of an uncom-
municated threat by the deceased be admitted by the court, where it
can be shown that the deceased did some act, even though circum-
stantial, which indicates that he may have been the aggressor?
This specific question confronted the United States Circuit Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia in the comparatively recent
103 Cal. App. 583, 284 Pac. 950 (1930); Nordlund v. Nordlund, 97 Wash. 475,
166 Pac. 795 (1917); Campbell v. Campbell, 149 Mich. 147, 112 N.W. 481
(1907). As to constructive desertion or abandonment, see Evans v. Evans, 247
Ky. 1, 56 S.W. 2d 547 (1933); Reynolds v. Reynolds, 224 Ky. 668, 6 S.W. 2d
1078 (1928); Axton v. Axton, 182 Ky. 286, 206 S.W. 480 (1918).
1 MADDEN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF PEnSONS AND DoMEsTc RELATIONS,
269 (1931).
" Supra note 15 at 280.
